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SOMETIR/IES IT MATTERS: 
A RESOURCE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW* 
Richard Lempert 
This paper might look very different had I been asked a sensible question. 
Instead, I was told that the focus of the program for which this paper was 
originally prepared was "Does law matter?" and that my particular assignment 
was to discuss the question of whether the criminal law mattered. Of course the 
criminal law matters. One hardly need be a committed functionalist to conclude 
from the dense net of criminal laws that envelop modern societies that the 
criminal law must matter or else we would not have so much of it or conversely, 
because we have so much of it, it must matter. And if this abstract exercise were 
not satisfying, one could go to any prison and ask the men and women therein 
whether the criminal law mattered. They would tell you it did; if it didn't they 
would not be forfeiting years of their lives. Moreover, there is a long tradition of 
research on the deterrent and other preventive functions of the criminal law 
(Lempert 198 1-82, Gibbs 1975). The evidence, ranging from Andenaes (1966) 
.anecdotal evidence of a crime wave during a Montreal police strike to the most 
sophisticated modern quantitative research (e.g. Loftin et al. 1992) is that people's 
actions are sometimes ordered a t  least in part by fear of criminal sanctions, and it 
may be that other aspects of the criminal law such as its presumed educative 
effects also affect behavior. 
*This paper was originally prepared for the Law and Society Association's 1993 
Summer Institute for Sociolegal Studies. I would like to thank Paul Hunt for his 
research assistance and Gail Ristow for preparing the manuscript and tracking 
down numerous citations. 
The situation is, to be sure, somewhat more complicated than this. 
Certainty of punishment appears far more important in ordering behavior than 
differences in the severity of punishment given the apprehension of violators 
(Gibbs 1975, Lempert 1981-82). Thus what matters most is that some sort of 
police force catch those who violate the law's norms. The penalties that the law 
specifies and the penalties actually inflicted appear less important, and marginal 
differences in the severity of penalties such as the symbolically important 
difference between the death penalty and life imprisonment may not matter a t  all 
(Lempert 198 1). 
Indeed, it may not be fear of the law's penalty which mediates the criminal 
law's impact. - In many cases, particularly involving minor offenses, the 
implications of being '!found out" for personal relations - including the anticipated 
embarrassment of it all - may account for law's impact. Thus, various researchers 
have reported. that when it. comes to minor crimes like shoplifting or smoking 
marijuana, anticipated peer sanctions are more important than legal sanctions as 
determinants of behavior (Anderson et al. 1977, Burkett and Jensen 1975, 
Saltzman et al. 1983). Even in the case of serious crimes, such as drug dealing at 
a level that might involve years in prison, the law's efficacy may depend more on 
breaking up relationships or the threat of doing this than it does on the actual 
apprehension of violators or the sentences they receive (Lieb et al. 1984). 
Moreover, deterrence is a subjective phenomenon. Lon Fuller (1964), the eminent 
jurisprudent, was more than philosophically right, a law that is not communicated 
is no law a t  all. Indeed, how a law is communicated and the degree of threat 
inherent in the communication may be more important in ordering behavior than 
the law's specific content. Thus Ross, who has investigated crackdowns on drunk 
driving throughout the world, consistently finds marked deterrent effects in the 
early days of highly publicized crackdowns, but except in rare instances, the effects 
do not endure the dissipation of publicit,y over time, even when neither the law nor 
enforcement patterns revert to their pre-crackdown patterns (Ross 1982). 
These contingencies, while interesting in their own right (many have been 
the subject of books), do not, however, prcblematize the fundamental question of 
whether the criminal law matters. The quick answer, "of course it matters" is 
still the most obvious and the most obviously correct. Only John Griffiths's (1979) 
tactic of separating law from power and the criminal law from its enforcement 
seems to problematize the question, but Griffiths's tactic is unsatisfactory. Power 
is not something that can be separated from law. As socio-legal theorists from 
Weber (1968) through Black (1976) have recognized, power, which is to  say the 
~-2:: potential for enforcement, is built into law's very definition. 
. So why was I asked to address the question, "Does (the criminal) law 
,. . matter?" Why wasn't the answer presupposed and the more sensible question, 
G..+ ,*- "How does (the criminal) law matter" asked? The latter was the question I would 
*- 
sgy have to address in any event, but it was the former question that started my 
thinking. Contemplating it, I was reminded of a comic strip I had seen some years 
ago. An older man is reflecting on love and marriage. In the strip's first panel he 
is recalling the innocence of youth when fueled by romantic novels and Hollywood 
movies he envisioned marriage as a state of continual love in which one lives 
happily ever after. In the second panel he is recalling his college and early post- 
college years when failed affairs rendered him cynical and he came to believe that 
there was no such thing as enduring love and that marriage was largely an 
institution of convenience. In the final panel he is reflecting on twenty years of 
married life and says of love in marriage, "I had no idea it was every other day." 
If we make our "L" word not love but law, and the criminal law in 
particular, we have here a nice metaphor for the mattering of the criminal law, 
and a reason why it was perhaps not so silly to ask the question "Does (the 
criminal) law matter" in the first instance. The metaphor is nice in two ways. 
First, if we look to where we expect to see the criminal law mattering, we do not 
always see effects we associate with law. With respect to the criminal law as a 
mechanism for ordering behavior, for example, most often when we see behavior 
ordered in accordance with the criminal law's norms, we give the criminal law's 
norms no weight whatsoever in explaining perceived compliance. If people are not 
killing each other, it is not because the criminal law proscribes killing but because 
people know, totally apart from the criminal law, that killing is morally wrong and 
that killers are detested. In subgroups or situations where this is not true, where, 
for example killing is a uray of proving manhood, murder, despite the criminal law, 
occurs with alarming.frequency. Yet occasionally, as in some of the deterrence 
. studies 1. have cited, law.~affects the behavior ,of enough people so that its 
measurable aggregate impact is unmistakable. l Thus the effects of criminal law 
- .- on the social.order are. not-always obvious, .but.fi-om time to  time they appear. 
a Second, as with marriage and love, the relationship which allows law's effects to 
appear and disappear continues. Without an enduring marriage the love that our 
comic strip character spoke of would not be felt every other day. Similarly, without 
the ongoing applicability of the criminal law and a continually viable enforcement 
apparatus, the world would not occasionally appear ordered by the application of 
criminal law. 
Even when the parallel between law and morality is as close as it is in the case of murder we 
cannot be certain that some of the compliance we attribute to morality is not, in fact a resultant of 
the law's threat. Andenaes (1966); Stephen (1883). 
But now I wish to get away from compliance mechanisms like deterrence to 
discuss other (and in my view more interesting) ways in which the criminal law 
has this "now you see it, now you don't" form of mattering. Criminal law is 
symbolic. I t  not only symbolizes a society's abhorrence of certain behavior 
(Durkheim 1984, Garland 1990), it also and perhaps more powerfully symbolizes 
the restraints that a society puts on itself and on the government that is its agent 
in dealing coercively with its members. Indeed, when we speak of the "rule of 
law1'- .we largely have in mind the criminal law and its associated regulatory law, 
like rules of criminal procedure, that condition the applicability of criminal 
sanctions. If the criminal law is largely what we have in mind when we speak of 
the "rule of law," i&e criminal law must matter or at  -least must appear to matter, 
for if the criminal law clearly did not matter, the "rule of law" could not be a 
dominant motif in the ideologies of capitalist democracies. 
In ascribing this role to the criminal law, I am following the lead of E.P. 
Thompson (1975), Douglas Hay (1975)' Isaac Balbus (1973) and others (e.g., 
Genovese 1972) who have agreed that the idea of the rule of law, worked out 
through the visible play of the criminal justice system, is a central feature in 
capitalist systems of domination. In their view fairness -- exemplified by occasions 
on which the criminal law honors its own restraints to free less powerful social 
actors from the threat of social sanctions or respects its own norms in punitively 
sanctioning powerful social actors -- is the central mechanism by which the 
criminal law legitimates an unequal social order. Thus Thompson describes the 
workings of the Black Act, draconian legislation which punished severely - often 
capitally - such seemingly small (to modern eyes) violations of the forest order as 
poaching deer and breaking fish dams. Some people were hung for these crimes, 
but others, known in the country to  be equally guilty, were acquitted because the 
law's rigorous requirements for proof could not be surmounted. With known 
poachers going free, even those-most oppressed by the acts could not dismiss the 
legal cloak for oppression as mere window dressing. Hay recounts the tale of Lord 
Ferrers, a British nobleman hanged and then dissected like a common criminal for 
murdering his steward. Not only was his hanging a contemporary subject of story 
and song; his story was still being told in the countryside half a century after the 
event. The story's inescapable conclusion is the lesson that no one is above the 
law, but it seemed to  have fascinated most not those who might reasonably have 
aspired to be above the law but rather those classes who urould be subject to law 
in any event. Isaac Balbus describes the fates- of inany of the black citizens 
arrested for race rioting in the 1960s. Low bail was eventually set for most of 
' 
them, and many cases foundered for want of proof. Again, these are the kinds of 
- outcomes that the-law formally demands; they are unexpected only t o  the extent 
that when class interests are palpable one might expect the rule of law t o  give 
way. 
This expectation, which accords most closely with an instrumental Marxist 
world view, is, however, naive. The point which each of the above authors in his 
own way makes is that the interests of capitalists as a class are by and large 
independent of the outcomes of any particular clash of capitalist and non-capitalist 
or even anti-capitalist interests. Capitalists systems of government are more 
viable and their domination is more complete when the governed are prone t o  
accept the legitimacy of laws the elite has enacted than when subordinate classes 
view capitalist law simply as an instrument of class warfare. If legitimacy can be 
enhanced by hanging the occasional nobleman or not hanging a known poacher, 
the collective interest of the capitalist class is thereby advanced, not threatened. 
One might, of course, argue that the criminal law need not matter to 
achieve these ends. All that is needed is for people to think the law is being 
applied fairly, and to achieve this end widespread false consciousness suffices. 
Theoretically this is true, but the empirical examples belie the argument. The law 
mattered to those Black Act violators who lived because the state could not muster 
sufficient proof. I t  also mattered to Lord Ferrers who was convicted because he 
had broken the law and was sentenced to  death and executed according to the 
law's strictures. He would not have believed that his execution was mere 
appearance. More generally, if these arguments about the connection between the 
rule of law and legitimacy are correct, I do not think that there is any escape from 
. , c  the notion that the criminal law as a set of punitive norms and state constraints 
sometimes matters. The best and sometimes the only way to get people to think 
that law applies is to apply it. 
.. . People confronted with examples like those I have mentioned are not 
mistaken if they think the law mattered in these instances; surely it did. Their 
mistake, if they make one, is t o  think that the clear, visible appearance of the 
importance of law means that law always matters in the same way as it does in 
its visible appearances. The fact that there are cases in which law matters more 
than immediate instrumental class interests does not mean that powerful interests 
cannot in large measure determine when law matters. The law of the Black Act 
mattered not only when the law freed some accused but when the law hanged, 
punished, or deterred others. Thus both the punitive substantive and restraining 
procedural aspects of the criminal law seemed to have served class interests. 
Moreover, prosecutions and convictions under the Black Acts were not uniform 
over time; rather there was an ebb and flow which may have reflected the felt 
needs of the dominant classes for the protections these laws accorded their 
interests. This does not mean that dominant classes necessarily turn on and off 
the two sides of the criminal law as if they were working a spigot; rather a less 
than fully conscioussense of urgency may motivate the application of law and the 
degree to which law matters. 
Where the felt need for punitive measures is great, the constraints that 
inhere in proceeding through criminal law may not for a time matter. The good 
example of this is application of law in the riots that Balbus discusses. While the 
riots were ongoing rioters arrested were often not brought immediately before 
judges as the law required or if brought there was no serious effort made to 
determine whether charged felonies were really misdemeanors or whether there 
was enough evidence to constitute probable cause to hold a person. Bail, when it 
was .set, was set far out of proportion to  the charged crime. . Some days later, 
.:..when -the -rioting. had ended .and it .was :becoming costly- to hold ,those- arrested, 
proper forms were followed. Bail was set or alleged participants were released on 
.. . .recognizance, -felony. charges .were-dropped ,and the like. 
Even more instructive is the "exception that proves the rule." Judge 
George Crockett, Jr .  a black Recorder's Court judge in Detroit, was almost alone 
among judges hearing riot cases in Detroit in that he tried to make the law matter 
even while the riot was ongoing. Rioters brought to his court had reasonable bail 
set based on the charges brought against them even if it meant releasing them to 
the streets before calm prevailed. For this he was excoriated in the press as if he 
were acting illegally. In a sense the press was not too far from the mark. Judge 
Crockett was not acting illegally, but he was not acting role responsibly if his role 
was to  be a social control agent. Arguably this is a judge's most fundamental role; 
it is simply one that in democratic societies is latent most of the time, for it 
ordinarily does not clash with the judge's manifest role as an agent of the rule of 
law. But in the midst of a riot the roles clash. 
During the riot Judge Crockett was a hero only in portions of the black 
community and a t  some local law schools, segments of the community that are 
atypical in the seriousness with which they are likely to take a judge's "rule of 
law" role. When the riot was safely ended, praise for Crockett grew and his 
performance during the riot eventually sent him to Congress where he served for 
many years in the House of Representatives. 
Those who continued to excoriate Judge Crockett for his role in the riots 
were not acting in completely bad faith, even from a rule of law perspective. They 
wanted to believe that when Crockett freed alleged rioters in the midst of the riot 
there was some aspect of his manifest role responsibility - his responsibility as an 
?.-&.- agent of the law - that he was violating. They could not believe that a good faith 
i-: ..F 
r\,- .?A,,. interpretation of the law not only allowed him to act as he had but in fact required 
it. The intuition that "there ought to be a law" that  elevated the judge's social 
c..  . control responsibilities above his legal duties was a strong one. I still recall the 
Wayne County prosecutor, who in the spring following the Detroit riots visited a 
- seminar I was teaching on riots the week after Judge Crockett had visited. When 
he learned that Judge Crockett had participated a week earlier, he tried to pump 
me for information about what Judge Crockett had said. He was sure that there 
was evidence somewhere that the judge had acted in bad faith or from illegal 
motives. And he assumed that  I as  a law professor would share this view. 
To recapitulate briefly, the criminal law in both its procedural restraining 
and its substantive punitive aspects typically has an on againtoff again quality. In 
order to fulfill a legitimating function, the criminal law must sometimes matter in 
the sense that the norms inherent in the law's rules are occasionally applied in 
cases to the apparent frustration of a dominant class's interests. But the criminal 
law need not always matter in this way to fill a legtimating function. Indeed, law 
that matters too much is potentially counterproductive. Too many instances of 
contravening the dominant class's interests could aggregate to the point where 
their total cost to the dominant group outweighed the benefits they brought. 
However, so long as the dominant group largely controls the content of legal norms 
in the first place, this danger even in an avowedly liberal legal system is unlikely 
to be great. 
A second implication of this analysis is that the criminal law matters in a 
different macro sense whether or not it matters in the sense that its norms are 
applied in individual cases. I t  matters because the pattern of on againioff again 
mattering a t  the case level lends legitimacy to a system of domination a t  the 
macro level. This-is essentially the argument of the three authors I have focused 
on most closely in this section. There is a problem with this implication, however. 
. No one has ever proven that 1aw.matters in this macro. sense. Although the 
arguments of such scholars as Thompson, Hays, and Balbus are plausible, and are 
additionally attractive in .their ability to  rescue us from a simplistic, empirically , 
untenable instrumental Marxism, there is no proof that the rule of dominant 
classes is legitimated by the occasional legal victories of the dominated or by 
instances in which those on top are criminally prosecuted. And it is hard to see 
how this legitimation hypothesis could be rigorously tested. Although contrary to 
the views of some skeptics (Hyde, 1983) it is clear that legal procedures can have 
legitimating functions (Thibaut and Walker 19 75, Lind and Tyler 1988, Tyler 
1984, 1988). These functions, however, operate at the case level and largely turn 
on procedures that allow parties to feel that they have participated in legal 
decisions affecting them. To this extent the implementations of the procedural 
protections that the criminal law grants the accused may affect how criminals 
regard their treatment by the law (Casper 1972, 1978). The hypothesis that the 
criminal law matters because it legitimates class domination through the support 
it renders the rule-of-law ideology must, however, remain an hypothesis. 
The idea of the rule of law does not, of course, just apply a t  the macro level. 
The processing of each case is supposed to be an occasion for the application, of the 
rule-of-law, but here too the criminal lam7 sometimes matters and sometimes does 
not. Let me give two mundane examples which illustrate both the theme of the 
appearance, disappearance and reappearance of the rule of criminal law in case 
processing and the tension between the need for social control and the genuine pull 
that the rule of law ideology has on actors within the criminal justice system. 
Consider first the initial case in a string of narcotics cases. In this case the 
arresting officer when pressed admits that the only reason he searched the 
defendant and found the heroin he uncovered is because the defendant appeared to 
S%: 
+$; 
be a suspicious looking person. The judge applying the Manx, exclusionary rule 
;z:. 
- t suppresses the heroin as the fruit of an unreasonable search, and the criminal goes 
free. Here the criminal law which proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures 
9; clearly matters. Without this norm, the accused would no doubt have been 
-e- 
: convicted of drug possession. 
The next case is similar, except that the officer testifies that he saw the 
suspect reach into his pocket for a cigarette lighter and pull out not just the lighter 
but a clear plastic packet containing white powder, which fell to the ground. Since 
the powder looked like heroin the officer picked i t  up and arrested the accused. 
The judge finds that there was probable cause for arrest; she denies the motion to 
suppress, and the accused is convicted of drug possession. Again the criminal law 
appears to have mattered. In this instance the requisites of a reasonable search 
and seizure were met, and in accordance with the law the evidence was allowed. 
The case, however, has the surprising consequence of spawning a generation 
of clumsy criminals. In hundreds of cases that follow police officers testify that 
they made arrests for drug possession after they saw suspects accidentally drop 
packets containing illicit drugs like heroin, marijuana, cocaine. Such testimony 
becomes so common that cases of this type are given a name - the "dropsy" cases. 
In each case motions to suppress the evidence are made, and in each case the 
motions are denied on the ground that an officer who sees a suspicious pack drop 
to the ground acts reasonably when she picks it  up and if it looks as if i t  contains 
drugs has probable cause to seize it  and to make an arrest. Now it appears that 
the criminal law as a set of authoritative legal norms does not matter, for surely 
most of these officers are lying. 
In fact the situation is more complex and illustrates the many ways in 
which the criminal law can matter, for whether or not it matters depends upon 
whose perspective one takes. From the point of view of the defendant, the law7 
does not .matter, for.he is being convicted .despite the law's norms and his actual 
.behavior. 
From the point of view of the judge, the law does matter, for had she heard 
a-different .story, such -as .the- suspicious appearance story in our first example, she 
would have suppressed the evidence. Experienced judges to be sure will be 
suspicious, but should a judge do? One judge put it something like this, "I have 
heard enough dropsy stories that I am suspicious. But what am I to.do? In any 
given case a police officer's testimony appears more credible than that of a self- 
interested defendant.'"2 
From the point of view of the police officer, the story is mixed, for two 
criminal law norms are involved. The first, the criminal proscription on perjury, 
appears not to matter at all, for to make good pinches officers are willing to lie 
with abandon. However, search and seizure law does matter - not in the way that 
i t  should, which is channeling an officer's behavior on the streets, but in 
I have no citation for this quote - I read something like this once, but I no longer remember 
where. The reader will have to accept my claim that a t  least in gist it is accurate. For a similar 
sentiment expressed by a former district attorney see Heilbroner (1990). 
channeling behavior in court, which is to sap in specifying the content of an 
efficacious lie. As Weber (1978) long ago pointed out, the lawbreaker who 
operates by stealth is just as surely orienting himself to the demands of the 
criminal law as the person who refrains from tempting behavior because it is 
illegal. Each is acting differently than he would if the law's norms were different. 
Finally, to continue with this example, dropsy cases are sufficiently 
publicized, get such a bad name, and threaten to give the law such a bad name 
that crucial actors decide they have had enough. Indeed, in one New York case 
the New York County District Attorney urged the state's highest court to overturn 
dropsy seizures by shifting the burden of persuasion on the issue.3 Other judges 
:,, 3- also express skepticism of dropsy testimony, and its incidence seems to diminish. 
Indeed, in one instance long after the great concern over dropsy testimony had 
dissipated, a police officer was actually indicted for telling a dropsy story from the 
.:IF! - stand (Gellman 1988). Again the criminal law matters. Although dropsy 
-- testimony has not disappeared and some of it may have been replaced by different 
more acceptable lies, t o  some extent the law matters. 
Both the complexity and the on-off nature of how the criminal law matters 
are also nicely illustrated when we consider trials. In criminal cases, a steady but 
small source of reversals is due to error in instructing the jury. Considering the 
incidence of errors at  trial, reversals for erroneous instructions are proportionately 
more common than reversals for violating procedural rules of evidence because 
instructions often state the law as it applies to cases, and it is stretching things to 
hold such errors harmless4 When courts do reverse for instruction errors it is 
easy to see that the criminal law, as enunciated in instructions, matters. 
People u. Berrios, 2.8 N.Y. 2d 3rd, 279 N.E. 2d 709, 321 N.Y.S. 2d 884 (1971). 
Courts often do so, however, by looking at the instructions as a whole. In fact, the Supreme 
Court permits harmless error analysis even when instructions are constitutionally flawed. There 
However, research consistently reveals that jurors have great dificulty in 
comprehending instructions, sometimes performing a t  no better than chance levels 
(Charrow and Charrow 1979, Hastie el al. 1983, Ellsworth 1989, Reifman ct  al. 
1992) .~  Thus it would seem that the criminal law as enunciated in instructions 
hardly matters, for if jurors do not understand the instructions, how can 
instructions influence their decisions? An implication is that when appellate 
courts reverse for errors in instructions thus making the law matter, they are 
likely to be reversing for reasons that wouldn't have mattered had the jury heard 
the law stated correctly in the first instance. 
The puzzle here is that jurors often appear to decide cases correctly (Kalven 
and Zeisel. 1966; Hastie et al. 1983). ~ b w  can they do this if-the law as given t o  
.. them by the court does not matter?6 The obvious explanation is that their folk 
norms of what constitutes particular crimes largely coincide with the law's formal 
- , definitions, *and it ,is folk-norms rather than lega1,norms that matter. But where 
do the jurors' popular conceptions of what constitutes particular crimes come from. 
They may in some measure come from the criminal law's norms as conveyed to the 
jurors through various media. At the same time the law's norms in many areas 
are some limits however. Recently the Court held that an erroneous instruction on the meaning of 
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof could never be harmless error. Sullivan v.  
Louisiana: 113 S .  Ct. 2078 (1993). 
From a rhetorical standpoint instructions are often written in prose that even the college 
educated have great difficulty understanding. I have long speculated that one reason that may 
contribute to this is that marginalljr correct, difficult to understand instructions are most likely to 
be appealed. Appellate courts faced, as  they usually are, with criminals who appear factually 
guilty strain not to overturn merited convictions and approve dubious instructions. These 
instructions bearing an  appellate court's stamp of approval and widely disseminated through 
appellate opinions, then become safe instructions. Judges know they have been approved and that 
they will not get reversed for using them. I have, however, no way of testing this hypothesis; the 
most I can say is that it seems plausible to me. 
I am now assuming an extreme situation which probably only characterizes a minority of 
instructions. Even if some or most jurors do not understand difficult instructions, those who do 
can sometimes educate their fellow jurors in what these instructions mean. The empirical 
research, however, does not give one great confidence in such educational efforts (Ellsworth 1989, 
Hastie et al. 1993). 
reflect popular conceptions of what constitutes specific crimes. Thus, when jurors 
judge criminals, the law's norms probably matter whether or not the jurors fully 
understand their instructions. At the same time the law's norms may in large 
measure (depending on the crime) define behavior that jurors would have regarded 
as conviction-worthy regardless of the law. Thus law matters, but so do popular 
views, and one cannot separate out their effects on each other. 
To add a further wrinkle, there is another way in which instructions that 
state the law can matter. I t  appears that jurors late in their deliberations often 
have instructions reread as an aid in breaking deadlocks. The tactic may work 
<a because it gives one or two dissenting jurors a face-saving way to withdraw from a 
.*,I. 
., +- minority position. They can claim that while they continue to subscribe t o  the 
3r.z factual story they have been advocating, they realize that for technical legal 
reasons even their factual portrait does not mandate their verdict preference. Here 
.-.Y. the law matters simply because it exists. Indeed, a hard-to-understand instruction 
:?, may be more helpful in this respect than a clear one because dissenting jurors can 
read into the instruction whatever is needed to justify their switch to the majority. 
Alternatively jurors may understand or misunderstand an instruction as reread, 
and may use their new sense of understanding to break their deadlock. Whether 
legal norms matter in this situation depends on whether they have been correctly 
understood. 
Law As Resource 
The argument thus far is that the criminal law matters, sometimes in 
unexpected ways, both at the macro or societal level and at  the micro or case level. 
At each level, however, the norms of the criminal law or its potential availability 
does not determine occasions of mattering. Rather the criminal law has what I 
have called a "now you see itlnow you don't" or "on-againloff-again" character. In 
one situation where the law's norms lead one to expect it will matter it does, but 
in another situation where there is the same.normative expectation that the law 
will matter, it does not. In the remainder of the paper, I will offer a general 
explanation for this phenomenon, as I illustrate the law's intermittent mattering 
in other settings. 
The criminal law (indeed all law) matters in some settings where it is 
supposed to matter and not in others because it is a resource. At one time I 
thought that to speak this way was to speak metaphorically - that the law was not 
really a resource but was simply like one. But upon further reflection I think that 
to  call law a .resource is to speak~.precisely. It is a source of support that -people 
. . may .draw .on. in. the same- way they- draw on other resources in .their environment, 
such as savings account, accumulated human capital, and the availability of others 
. to help them achieve their goals. Law maybe an-intangible resource, as when one 
invokes the authority of law to  order another's behavior, or a tangible one, as 
when one calls the police t o  achieve the same end. 
In one sense, however, the criminal law is a special resource. It's norms 
specify when it is t o  be d e p l ~ y e d . ~  But the criminal law is not self-deploying. 
People must do this. More than occasionally, particularly in more formal legal 
settings, people draw on law as a resource in the way law "intends." People are 
arrested because they have violated the law; they are charged with the crimes 
their behavior best fits, and the rights that criminal procedure grants to the 
accused are honored throughout the guilt determining process. More often, 
however, people treat the law as they would any other resource available to them. 
7 ~ n  this, the criminal law differs from much civil law. The civil law provides norms that  may be 
deployed but does not specify that  they should be simply because occasions for their application 
exist (Lempert 1972). 
Legal norms do not determine law's activation. Rather people draw on law when 
it  is handy, convenient and cheaper than alternative means to particular goals. 
Even when the law is invoked as its norms specify it should be, the invocation is 
less likely to reflect respect for the law's norms than the sense that invoking those 
norms precisely is a cheap way to achieve an actor's interests. 
This helps explain the law's "on-againloff-again" quality. The law's norms 
specify a wide area where it  should be deployed; i.e., where i t  should matter. But 
people generally invoke law - which is to say make it matter - only when 
invocation is an efficacious route to their ends. So often when i t  appears that the 
law might or even should matter, i t  does not, for its authority is not needed. 
Conversely, the law's authority may be invoked in situations where its own norms 
appear to preclude this. This occurs because law can limit its own authority only 
when those who are responsible for enforcing the law respect those limits. This 
does not always happen. Ironically, those specially responsible for enforcing the 
law are often in the best position to avoid its limits. 
Whether law is handier, cheaper and more convenient than alternative 
ways to achieve particular ends depends not just on what the law as a set of rules 
is, but also, and usually more importantly, on how the law can be mobilized; that 
is, on those institutional arrangements that allow people to invoke the law. Two 
examples, drawn from the literature on policing, illustrate this point. 
First, consider the policing of skid rows. As both Bittner (1967) and 
Spradley (1970) emphasize, the policing of skid row is not so much about law 
enforcement as it is about order maintenance or keeping the peace. Indeed, 
Bittner7s motivation to look a t  skid row was his interest in how police functioned 
as peace keepers. He believed that skid row would provide him with the purest 
example of keeping order without law, but he found that this could not be done. 
His conclusion in this respect is worth quoting: 
Though our interest was focused initially on those police procedures 
that did not involve invoking the law, we found that the two cannot 
be separated. The reason for the connection is not given in the 
. circumstance that the roles of the "law officer" and of the "peace 
officer" are enacted by the same person and thus are contiguous. 
According to  our observations, patrolmen do not act alternatively as 
one or the other, with certain actions being determined by the 
intended objective of keeping the peace and others being determined 
by the duty to enforce the law. Instead, we have found that peace 
keeping occasionally acquires the external aspects o f  law enforcement 
(emphasis in original) (Bittner 1967 at 7 14). 
The police it seems are almost totally confused - or perhaps it is better to 
say "fused" - with the law they enforce. The situation on skid row reminds one of 
the classic Western movie scene in which a stranger in town taps an old timer on 
the shoulder and asks him, "Is there any law in this burgh?" The old timer points 
to the .marshal and repli.es, "Yep, you're looking a t  him." If the same question 
were,asked of a skid row denizen, he would answer "yes" and point to the 
policeman. Indeed, most people would find the linkage a natural one. 
Phenomenologically the connection between law and -enforcer cannot be 
disputed, but one may nonetheless ask whether the link is conceptually justified. 
From the legal perspective it clearly is not. The criminal law distinguishes 
between its norms and those that enforce them. Indeed, as we have already noted 
there is a special subset of criminal law norms - rules of criminal procedure - that 
is intended to control the behavior of the criminal law's enforcers. 
From a sociological perspektive, the situation is more interesting. Whether 
the fusion of law and enforcer is conceptually justified depends on how law is 
defined. Black's (1 9 7 6) definition of law as governmental social control suggests 
that if there is any divergence between the law's norms and the actions of 
governmental control agents, it is the latter rather than the former which defines 
the law. More classic definitions of law, like Weber's (1978) or Llewellyn and 
Hoebel's (1941) have two ingredients: a set of authoritative norms and an 
enforcement staff. The assumption is that the latter will act in conformity with 
the former. But this only sometimes happens. For example, on skid row the 
criminal law is sometimes appropriately enforced in full conformity with its norms, 
as when a drunk is arrested for his drunken behavior. On other occasions, the 
law's requirements for enforcement are fully met, but the invocation of the law is 
pretextual. Thus Bittner describes a situation in which in order to break up a 
group and forestall the possibility of a fight one of four equally drunk men was 
arrested while the others were simply sent on their way. On still other occasions 
legal norms are largely irrelevant. Thus a person who has been drinking but is 
not drunk may be arrested on a drunkenness charge when his real "crime" is 
cursing the police officer or, as in another of Bittner's examples, the paddy wagon 
is handy, and it is more efficient to arrest the drinker at the time then than to 
wait until he is actually drunk and send again for the paddy wagon. 
From the point of view of the arrestee, what matters is the action of the 
police officer rather than the norms that also figure in law's de f in i t i~n .~  But is it 
law that is mattering to an arrestee when an officer acts? Where the officer's 
actions and legal norms are congruent, it is easy to  conclude that it is law that 
matters. Where, however, the law is a pretext for action, the question of whether 
law matters has no simple answer, even conceptually. To the extent that law is a 
set of rules, the law appears not to matter since legal norms are not being 
correctly applied, but to the extent that law consists of the actions of an 
authorized enforcement staff, law matters, for actors with a generalized legal 
authority to act are so acting, even if the specific reasons they invoke are 
inapposite. Thus it is law which allows the police to make arrests, even if law in a 
narrower rule-reverential sense does not authorize it. One might say in these 
situations that law matters, but that the law is not working as intended. Yet even 
The latter may come to matter as the arrestee is further processed. 
this conclusion is risky because it assumes that the intent behind law is obvious 
from the language of a law's provisions. I11 applying drunkenness or vagrancy 
statutes to people who are not actually drunk or legally vagrant, the police officer 
'may nevertheless be using the law for precisely the peace keeping purposes the 
law's drafters intended (c.f. Wilson & Kelling 1982). Indeed, such laws often only 
vaguely define forbidden behavior in order to provide the police and through them 
society with generalized order maintenance resources. 
In some situations where police conduct differs fi-om the commands of law, 
there is a clear sense in which the criminal law does not matter because the police 
action does not simply fail to  conform with the literal requisites of legal norms: it 
positively .violates them. Examples include police who solicit bribes t o  tear up 
, -traffic tickets or who charge those they have .beaten with resisting arrest in order 
to provide cover stories for their abuse. But in another sense the law matters here 
as well: for it is the police.officer's privileged-position- with respect to legal 
resources that allows the officer to transform the public resource that is the 
criminal law into an instrument for private benefit. In exploiting this resources 
for personal gain, the officer is acting much like the office worker who copies her 
tax return on an office xerox machine. The difference between the two is the easy 
access to resources that their institutional positions allow. The office worker is 
fortuitously situated with respect to a xerox machine, while a police officer is 
fortuitously situated with respect to  the law. 
In most circumstances, of course, the police are not violating the law. Most 
of the time the criminal law in its normative sense matters to the police, and so it 
matters to us as well. Motorists who have not been speeding are seldom stopped 
for speeding and those given speeding tickets usually have been traveling a t  least 
5 mph over the speed limit. Miranda warnings are real and given, and the "third 
degree" has largely disappeared from the repertoire of police interrogation 
techniques. Arrested drug dealers have typically been dealing in drugs, arrested 
murderers are usually likely to have killed or are legitimately suspected of doing 
so, and so on. In short, the police typically use the public resource that is law for 
public ends and invoke the criminal law in ways consistent with the law7, c norms. 
Their major failing, if it is a failing, is that they do not invoke the law in many 
situations where the law apparently intends its own invocation. Thus the criminal 
law often doesn't matter the way it  should or i t  doesn't matter a t  all because of 
limited institutional capacities for enforcement. Some legal scholars have been 
quite troubled by this (Goldstein 1960) while other more sociologically oriented 
students of the police see underenforcement as inherent in the nature of police 
work (Skolnick 1975). 
The criminal law is, of course, a resource not just for the police but for all of 
us. Anyone can "call the cops," and many people do. Indeed, the police are a 
resource apart from the law, for many calls to the police seek aid, like help in 
transporting a sick person to the hospital, that the caller knows is not part of the 
police's law enforcement mission (Wilson, 1968). Even where the police are called 
because the law has been broken, there is a tendency among both police and 
citizens to privatize the public resource that is law. Black (1971), for example, 
found in his study of the social organization of arrest, that complainants' 
preferences were a major factor in determinihg whether an alleged lawbreaker 
was arrested. The other two major factors predicting arrest in Black's study are 
whether the offense complained about was a felony (arrest more likely) or a 
misdemeanor and whether the suspect in the field was disrespectful (arrest more 
likely) or not. We have thus in one study a nice illustration of the three ways that 
the criminal law as a resource is most commonly employed. First, it is employed 
by the police for the public end of crime control. Second, i t  is employed by the 
police as a private resource to revenge affronts. And third, it is employed by 
complainants as a private resource to control others' behavior. 
Returning our attention to the last of these uses, that is t o  the use of the 
criminal law as a resource for citizens, one can ask how effective it in this respect. 
This depends on both legal and institutional considerations. Sometimes the laws 
that citizens wish to draw on do not exist. Thus, until recently most states did not 
have legislation that prevented "stalking." Police receiving complaints of stalking 
often purported to be helpless. The best they could offer terrorized victims was, "if 
he attacks call us," but this was no doubt of small solace. Ultimately stalking 
incidents culminating in beatings or homicides persuaded legislatures to pass laws 
making stalking itself a crime. These laws provide a new7 resource for both 
citizens and the police. 
Passing a law, however, is not enough to provide citizens with a viable 
resource. .Legal,resources are of limited value to citizens unless they can mobilize 
the law. With respect to the criminal law, this most often means mobilizing the 
police -- which can be problematic. Indeed, members of the same minority groups 
that disproportionately feel victimized by the police exploitation of the criminal 
law for police ends such as enforcing respect also disproportionately feel victimized 
by their inability to exploit the laws for their own ends. The police, they 
complain, often show up late when they call, or fail to respond a t  all (Hacker 
1992, Skolnick & Fyfe 1993). 
Merely mobilizing the police, however, is not enough to privatize law as a 
resource, for there is no guarantee that the police will respect a complainant's 
private preferences. Consider the situation of a woman who has called the police 
because her husband has struck her. Once the police are on the scene they have 
many options. They may ignore a caller's request for leniency and reaffirm the 
public nature of the law as resource; as when the police, following department 
policy, arrest an abuser that the complainant wants only to be warned. 
Alternatively once the police are on the scene they may appropriate the law to 
their own ends, as when they ignore a complainant's preferences and arrest a man 
who has been disrespectful toward them. In other situations both public and 
private claims to the use of law are denied as when the police refuse to arrest an 
abuser despite the complainant's preference. Another police response devalues the 
legal resource by giving a caller less enforcement than the law provides, as when 
an abuser is only separated from a spouse who wants him arrested. Finally, the 
police may follow a complainant's preferences, privatizing the legal resource in a 
way which may or may not conflict with the public's interest in how law is 
deployed. Only the last of these options allow those who mobilize the police to 
fully privatize the law as resource. In each of these circumstances, except where 
nothing is done, the criminal law clearly matters, but it matters for different ends. 
And even where nothing is done, the law matters in a more limited sense, for it 
provided the excuse that brought the police to the scene, and the event that 
precipitated the call is a t  least likely to have been transformed (Sherman tk Berk 
1984). 
I have chosen the police to illustrate how the criminal law can be used as a 
resource and how the same cost-benefit considerations that mean that any 
resource will be used only intermittently and in some circumstances apply to the 
use of the criminal law. Thus it is not surprising that the scope of the criminal 
law's mattering is not defined by criminal law's self proclaimed scope of 
applicability, but instead turns on the contexts in which it might be applied and on 
alternative means to achieve goals within these contexts. The same point could 
have been made in the context of other institutional sectors. Totalitarian regmes, 
for example, need not free offenders whose actions challenge state interests on 
legal technicalities because the overwhelming force a t  their disposal means that 
they need not depend on legal legitimacy to maintain order. In some regimes at  
some times it is, i11.other words, less costly to rely on mechanisms like secret police 
than on the law. Public defenders and prosecutors need not agree on pleas which 
comply precisely with the law a defendant has violated. Subject to certain 
constraints, they may use the array of laws as a resource for fitting a punishment 
to the degree of crime (Sudnow 1965, Maynard 1984). Judges can ignore the 
penalties that law puts a t  their disposal when they feel that lectures or other 
"situational sanctions" will have an adequate punitive and deterrent effect 
(Mileski 197 1, Wheeler et al. 1968, Merry 1990). Prison officials can turn much of 
the social control of prisons over to the inmates and prison guards can prefer "tune 
ups" to formal legal proceedings when prisoners have behaved improperly (Sykes 
1958, Jacobs 1977, Marquart & Couch 1985, 1989). 
Whereas I was reminded of a comic strip a t  the start of this paper, I am 
reminded of a W.S. Gilbert lyric a t  its.conclusion. In the operetta Ruddigore, at  
the conclusion of one of Gilbert's finest patter songs, the characters sing: 
This particularly rapid, unintelligible patter 
Isn't generally heard, and if it is it doesn't matter! 
If the patter songs were not generally heard, there would be no sense in writing 
them; nor would there be a point to the quoted lines, if hearing them didn't 
matter. But as Gilbert well knew, his patter songs were showstoppers. They 
were the standout features of the most popular Gilbert and Sullivan operettas and 
made for the few memorable moments in the less popular ones.9. Gilbert could 
mock them because they mattered so much. So I think it is with the criminal law. 
If we expect the law to matter as it is enunciated, we can spot many situations in 
E.g., "My name is John Wellington Wells" in The Sorcerer. 
which i t  doesn't matter. We can even spot situations where apparently applicable 
criminal law does not matter by any standards. But ultimately the question, 
"Does the law matter?" is worth asking not because the law's mattering is 
problematic, but because it  matters in so many ways that we are well advised to 
sort them out. I have tried to begin that task in this paper. Much remains to be 
said. 
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